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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the moderating effects of heuristics on the relationship between asset specificity, formal contracting/relational 
contracting and value creation. More importantly, this paper explores the role of heuristics on the inter-organizational relationships. An integrative 
theoretical framework is proposed, grounded on literature review on transaction cost economics and heuristics. Then, the relationships between heuristics, 
asset specificity, formal contracting/relational contracting and value creation are analyzed, using the proposed theoretical framework. Heuristics 
has different implications to the choice of governance mechanisms (formal contracting and relational contracting) and value creation. Moreover, 
this work develops hypotheses indicating how heuristics moderates the relations between these constructs and highlights future research directions 
relating to inter-organizational relationships. Heuristics, assets specificity and governance mechanisms alone have limited capacity of improving 
inter-organizational value creation, but combined they can support improvement initiatives. Nevertheless, heuristics, assets specificity and governance 
mechanisms can also suppose some novel obstacles to effective inter-organizational value creation. Several studies have analyzed value creation in 
the inter-organizational relationships, but, to the best of our knowledge no study has focused on the role of heuristics. This work can draw attention of 
the managers by making them aware of how important is heuristics as a decision-making tool which can influence governance of asset specificities.
Keywords: Transaction Cost Economics, Supplier-manufacturer Relationship, Strategy, Governance, Social Factors 
JEL Classifications: M30, M31
1. INTRODUCTION
Transaction cost economics (TCE) provides “rational economic 
reasons” to craft the governance mechanism (Williamson, 1985. 
p. 52). Using TCE, the choice of a governance mechanism is 
determined through the combined or single influence of the 
transactional attributes (e.g. asset specificity). Malone and 
Crowston (1994) argue that the executives having responsibility 
of managing inter-organizational relationships should be able to 
distinguish among value creation alternatives and then find a better 
match with different management strategies. Cohcndct (1999) 
asserts that multinational firms seek to govern routine activities 
differently from what they do for innovative activities. Given such 
notions on possible strategies, heuristics could be considered as a 
simple strategy that could facilitate governance decision on asset 
specificities.
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) claim that a successful 
business model creates a heuristics logic that connect technical 
potential with the realization of economic value. It is, therefore 
meaningful to consider heuristics as a tool or strategy as it can 
help firms in deciding efficient governance mechanisms for their 
specific investments. There is limited understanding on whether 
heuristics can be used to foster value creation objective in the 
inter-organizational relationships. In such a context, this paper 
aims to explore the role of heuristics in the inter-organizational 
relationships where a major focus is given to the governance of 
asset specificities. Many firms have been practicing heuristics 
considering that it is a simple, affordable and valuable means 
of decision makings since long back in the history. However, 
heuristics has been reported both as beneficial and/or devastating 
in the extant literature. Kahneman and Tversky (2000) state that 
individuals attempt to be cognitively consistent when making 
choices. A firm thus being a place of individuals working together, 
may also attempt to be cognitively consistent during the courses of 
making decisions. These statements clearly support the possibility 
of using heuristics in business decisions. Moreover, the questions; 
what helps firms manage activities differently from what they do 
for innovative activities? What helps firms while distinguishing 
among value creation alternatives? And so on, could be tackled 
using reflexive and reproduction heuristics. Heuristic refers to 
experience-based techniques for problem solving, learning, and 
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discovery that give a solution which is not guaranteed to be 
optimal, heuristic methods are used to speed up the process of 
finding a satisfactory solution through the mental shortcuts to 
facilitate the cognitive load of making a decision, examples of 
this method include using a rule of thumb, an educated guess, 
an intuitive judgment, stereotyping, or common sense (“http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuristics,”).
The focus of this paper is to explore the moderating role of the 
reflexive and reproduction heuristics on the safeguarding of 
asset specificity. It is argued that the use of heuristics in decision 
makings could reduce transaction costs. Heuristics, being a fast 
and frugal individual based decision mechanism can influence 
firms to device an efficient and effective governance mechanism 
for their transactions.
This paper argues in two main respects, first the interaction of 
heuristics with the firms’ asset specificities can lead to value 
creation (for this study, value creation is limited to the performance 
outcomes such as developing sustainable capabilities and cost 
reduction). Second, the decision-making individuals in the firms 
do use heuristics that guides them to find better safeguarding for 
their asset specificities, even though these shortcuts reflect shared 
social heuristics that improve coordination among exchange 
partners within a wider and complex supply chain. It is to note 
that the terms: Heuristics, social heuristics, judgmental heuristics, 
decision heuristics, and reflexive and reproduction heuristics are 
interchangeably used in this paper.
This study has both theoretical and practical implications. The 
theoretical implication is that it explores the role of heuristics 
in an inter-organizational value creation arena; this is because 
such heuristics are a source of market order much as price in 
markets, hierarchy in firms (Williamson, 1975; 1992). We believe 
heuristics can play critical role in value chain coordination, 
especially in exchange settings where shared action is placed in 
semiautonomous networks. Similarly, the practical implication 
is that such heuristics can preclude the willingness of decision 
making authorities in an exchange to embrace novelty/innovation 
and change. This is perhaps due to preoccupied risk adverse 
nature of most people as they satisfy at minimum cost. However, 
others would not simply satisfy themselves rather they become 
ambitious and challenge heuristics just because of their easy access 
to advanced resources or highly reliable mechanisms.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section presents a brief review on TCE perspective with special 
focus on asset specificity, governance mechanisms (i.e., formal/
relational contracting). Furthermore, basic understanding on 
heuristics (i.e., reflexive and reproduction heuristics) also follows 
through some discussions, argumentations, and articulations 
explaining the role of heuristics in the process of deciding 
mechanisms that safeguard asset specificity.
Increase in asset specificity needs appropriate safeguarding 
mechanisms ex ante so that the safeguard of asset is ensured 
(Williamson, 1981; 1985). In TCE, transaction is used as the unit 
of analysis, where the level of asset specificity, the transaction 
frequencies, and the uncertainties surrounding to transactions 
determine the efficient way of organizing and governing inter-
firm relationships (Williamson, 1981). Thus, the intent of the 
TCE is to provide safeguarding mechanisms for asset specificities. 
Several studies have confirmed the logics for safeguarding asset 
specificity. Asset specificities are the durable investments that are 
undertaken in support of particular transactions (Williamson, 1985; 
Williamson, 1996), which have a lower value in an alternative 
use or user (e.g., site specificity, physical specificity, human 
asset specificity, dedicated assets, and brand name). Rindfleisch 
and Heide (1997) state that asset specificity creates safeguarding 
problems in buyer supplier relationships. Such investment 
causes bilateral dependence and lock-in effects living room for 
opportunism.
Contract specifies detail guidelines and safeguarding devices 
(Reuer and Ariño, 2007). However, formal contracting is a 
cumbersome affair as it demands much of the effort, information, 
and other resources too. All together drafting formal contract 
becomes costly; therefore, the consequences of a contractual 
break are significant in order for the contracting parties to 
agree on detailed formal contracting (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Moreover, formal contract specifies “conditions that exacerbate the 
potential for ex post inefficiencies should lead to more exhaustive 
agreements” (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993. p. 127). Thus, formal 
contracts usually specify the terms of an agreement between two 
parties and represent the transaction or work to be done in a variety 
of forms that can range from informal promises to formalized 
agreements; from explicit and complete to incomplete phrasing of 
task execution and output; and many more (Schepker et al., 2014).
There are a number of empirical studies supporting the positive 
association between asset specificity and formal contracting 
(Buvik and Haugland, 2005; Buvik and Reve, 2001; Cannon and 
Perreault, 1999; Ghosh and John, 2009; Haugland et al., 2002; 
Heide, 2003; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sande, 2008; Sunde, 2007; 
Svendsen, 2005).
Heide and John (1992) state relational norms (e.g., solidarity, 
flexibility, and information exchange) can control opportunistic 
behavior through providing safeguards to the asset specificities. 
This shows relational norms can provide control in buyer supplier 
relationships, Poppo and Zenger (2002) state that the way formal 
contract safeguards, is not different from the way relational norms 
safeguards asset specificities. The past studies (e.g., Andersen and 
Buvik, 2001; Bercovitz et al., 2006; Haugland et al., 2002; Heide 
and John, 1990; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sunde 2007; Zhou 
et al., 2008) have reported positive associations between asset 
specificities and relational norms.
Firms, markets, and relational contracting are important economic 
institutions (Williamson, 1985). TCE has been popular as a 
theory that highlights the importance of sociological factors 
such as the behavioral norms between transactors in determining 
the effectiveness of governance mechanisms (Macneil, 1980). 
Relational norms are perceived as strong governance mechanisms 
(Artz and Brush, 2000; Blois and Ivens, 2007). These norms 
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reduce exchange cost through changing behavioral orientation of 
the alliance (Artz and Brush, 2000).
There has been a rise in the use of heuristics by modern small 
and medium sized firms as a decision making tool (Shah and 
Oppenheimer, 2008). Thus, heuristics may be considered as a tool/
strategy complementing decision making in a firm. “A heuristic 
is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal 
of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately 
than more complex methods” (Gigerenzer and Wolfgang, 2011. 
p. 454). Heuristics trade off some level of accuracy for less effort, 
nonetheless, this may result beyond such classical assumption. 
Furthermore, heuristics aims to facilitate judgment process more 
accurately by ignoring other information which in some way may 
sound strange but this is how it works. We have pursued the term 
reflexive very much as described by Encarta Dictionary: English 
U.K., that states: Reactions produced automatically, unthinkingly, 
and totally predictably in response to events. This means reflexive 
heuristics are extremely faster and applied immediately without 
any preparation. Similarly, reproduction heuristics denote the 
straight forward act of reproducing something. In this way, this 
paper recognizes ‘reflexive and reproduction heuristics’ as the 
immediate reactions mostly reproduced by the decision makers/
managers.
Reflexive heuristics are based on a priori decision rules that 
provide a point of reflection and ex post facto justification, for 
instance, answering on how we know firms have done right things 
in this market, similarly the reproduction heuristics provides a 
social proxy for search, choice, and judgment that reproduces 
status quo, for instance, answers on how firms secure a successful 
future in the market (Beamish and Biggart, 2010). Reflexive and 
reproduction heuristics could be understood as simple cognitive 
shortcuts that help individuals in making evaluations by using 
some rules or cues. These heuristics thereby avoid the processing 
and time costs related to exploring comprehensive possibilities. 
Furthermore, such heuristics may also be used to search for 
preferences, to build and catalogue perceptions, or to choose 
between competing choices. Reflexive and reproduction heuristics 
could help individuals and groups in solving problems encountered 
with imperfect information, and structural complexity.
TCE deals with the interaction between asset specificities and 
governance mechanisms, whereas reflexive and reproduction 
heuristics are the judgment strategies. Moreover, such heuristics 
could be pursued as conventionalized solutions that address a 
routine challenge and thus seek socially defensible options.
It is well understood that the asset specificity fosters the firms’ 
value creation objective. Finding a proper safeguarding mechanism 
has already been established by Williamson’s TCE, but, rather we 
believe in the role of heuristics as strategies leading to compliment 
the safeguarding mechanisms. Furthermore, heuristics could 
perhaps be considered as one dimension of the firms’ micro 
foundations (i.e., microeconomic analysis of the firms’ behavior) 
which exert influence on decisional episode of the governance 
fixing stage that serves safeguarding to asset specificity either 
made by the buyer or by the supplier. Furthermore, the interplay 
between reflexive and reproduction heuristics and asset specificity 
could perhaps trigger enhancement in value creation. As the 
asset specificity deserves higher value inside the relationship, 
it needs safeguarding to foster eventual investments needs 
and value creation. Value creation in an inter-organizational 
perspective constitutes some special focus on dyadic relationships 
and processes. Firms can’t create value in isolation; there 
have been several instances of cooperation between firms that 
fundamentally reshaped the field of marketing strategy (Webster, 
1992). Cooperation and coordination between firms has become 
fundamental to the success of many prominent companies in a 
variety of channel contexts for example, Toyota and its Keiretsu 
system, Caterpiller’s dealer network, Wintel system of Microsoft 
and Intel, business-format franchising executed by McDonald and 
Coca-Cola (Lilien and Grewal, 2012).
Thus, both the formal contracting and relational contracting could 
help attain safeguarding of the asset specificities. Following this 
we argue that the reflexive and reproduction heuristics moderates 
the relations: Between asset specificity and formal contracting, 
and asset specificity and relational contracting. The use of this 
heuristics has some specific influences over the safeguarding of 
asset specificities. We firmly believe that, the higher the use of 
reflexive and reproduction heuristics the greater would be the 
safeguarding of asset specificity. These heuristics could come 
from stronger individual reflections and more importantly can 
be expected to remain convincing in establishing the appropriate 
governance mechanism.
3. THEORETICAL MODEL AND 
HYPOTHESES
As we state, this paper deals with the role of reflexive and 
reproduction heuristics at the time when governing asset 
specificities. These heuristics are normally employed by the 
managers to activate the pre-decision procedures that garner 
special focus insuring strong expectation on asset specificities. 
This means reflexive and reproduction heuristics have become 
common tools for the firm level decision on governance choice, 
which should be employed based on sufficient homework by the 
responsible managers. This homework is performed with the help 
of several activities or tasks for example, inter-firm coordination, 
information gathering, information sharing, simulating post 
specific investment consequences, thorough analysis of potential 
pros and cons associated with the proposed specific investment, 
and so on so forth. All such tasks are performed along the use of 
reflexive, and reproduction heuristics. Basically, the managers 
in the firms are responsible to make use of such heuristics. In 
most forms, there are several managers dedicating to specialized 
functions and all of them expect coordination throughout their 
performance.
Synchronization of such small but pivotal tasks can bring 
major changes within firms and that has enormous impact on 
the backward and forward value chain. We firmly believe that 
reflexive and reproduction heuristics serve as highly valued micro 
foundation that deal with various aspects of assets specificity 
while undergoing through the procedures leading towards the 
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establishment of a governance mechanism. Such heuristics 
could be used along the proper adjustment tactics. Moreover, the 
qualified managers design heuristics mechanisms as per the need 
emerged across the functioning of the firm.
Based on the underpinnings from the literatures, and the 
discussion, the theoretical model below depicts the moderating 
effect of reflexive and reproduction heuristics on the relationship 
between asset specificity and value creation along with some 
predictions that are subject to future empirical tests. Figure 1 
clearly conveys the association between asset specificity, formal 
and relational governance modes, and value creation. Taking a 
simple look on the association between asset specificities and 
governance mechanisms, we argue that reflexive and reproduction 
heuristics exert influences on the process of fixing governance 
mechanism. The framework below presents a more interesting 
way on how the association between asset specificity and value 
creation is bridged along the moderating effects of reflexive and 
reproduction heuristics.
The theoretical model in Figure 1 predicts specific relationships; 
between asset specificity, relational contracting and value creation, 
and between asset specificity, formal contracting, and value 
creation within high and low use of reflexive and reproduction 
heuristics. Dashed lines represent the predicted relationship 
between asset specificity and value creation within each use 
(i.e. high or low) of reflexive and reproduction heuristics. More 
importantly, all these perceived relationships are clearly spelled 
below as specific hypotheses.
To explore the role of reflexive and reproduction heuristics in the 
inter-organizational relationships, we can use observations of the 
patterns of the associations. For instance, it could be observed 
that the managers are the think tank of firms, they are presumed 
to bear experiences and exposures of many ups and down business 
situations both within firms and outside firms that make them 
equipped with substantial knowledge. Some portions of such 
knowledge could be regarded as idiosyncratic one and that can best 
serve segment of the problem. Perhaps this is the reason that most 
firms used to pay handsome incentives to the experienced managers. 
Most firms are eager to entertain their managers’ reflexion and 
reproduction skill in the due course of operations. The framework 
below basically depicts the underlying relationships between the 
stated variables which can even further guide in understanding the 
implications of reflexive and reproduction heuristics.
Following section focus more on this model where connections 
between asset specificity, governance mechanisms, reflexive and 
reproduction heuristics, and value creation are discussed briefly.
3.1. Judgmental Heuristics as a Moderator to 
Safeguard Asset Specificity
In the 1970s, judgmental heuristics were recognized as an 
important uncertainty reduction strategy for individuals solving 
Figure 1: Theoretical model showing the effects of reflexive and reproduction heuristics
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complex problems (Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Heap, 1992; 
Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). Judgmental heuristics function as “rules 
of thumb,” reasonable shortcuts based on experience and careful 
remembrance. Cognitive psychologists find that when challenged 
with complex tasks, such as assessing probabilities, estimating 
numeric outcomes, and assessing risk through, for example, costs-
to-benefit ratios, people rely on judgmental heuristics.
Judgmental heuristics are basically used to assess probabilities 
and predict values, even though these heuristics are prone to 
biases. Such judgmental heuristics could be used to simplify 
and thus enable complex and timely decisions. While they 
are “highly economical and unusually effective,” based on 
some laboratory researches, judgmental heuristics can lead to 
“systematic and predictable errors in estimation” (Kahneman et al., 
1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). This shortcoming has become a concern to the cognitive 
psychologists (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009).
Even though heuristics may not be an effective solution always, it’s 
use has always been increasing not only in individual level but also 
in organizational level, and this could be because of some attributes 
for instance easy access, economy, promising and so on. A study 
by Parikh (1994) shows most managers in Europe, North America, 
Japan, Brazil, and India rely on “intuitive” heuristics rather than 
on this or similar statistical forecasting methods. Further, Shah 
and Oppenheimer (2008) claim that heuristics consists of the 
accurateness effort trade-off, and the ecological rationality; people 
save effort with heuristics but at the cost of accuracy. This has 
become a worth claim as the real-world phenomena corroborate 
the growing influence of heuristics.
Most literature agree on the fact that heuristics is concerned with 
human brains that synthesize information and abruptly use them 
to derive solutions in critical conditions.
Given the presence of several social heuristics it is necessary to 
make proper choice of heuristics that can truly contribute in a value 
chain setting. The variations and conflicts among exchange actors 
increases complexity in decision making, and this is frequently 
the case in most value chains. In order to find win-win solutions 
for all exchange partners a carefully thought heuristic approach 
is inevitable. Beamish and Biggart (2009) have stated consensus, 
reflexive, and reproduction heuristics are useful in networked 
production market. This paper intends to presume even deeper, 
that the firms’ use of reflexive and reproduction heuristics could 
influence the degree of safeguarding asset specificity. This means 
more reliable safeguarding is ensured through the higher use 
of reflexive and reproduction heuristics. These heuristics serve 
as micro foundation to build a specific governance mechanism 
that gives rise to value creation outcomes (i.e., cost reduction, or 
increase sustainability).
Understanding systematic patterns of social behavior and 
forming cooperative relationships are rather effective using 
such heuristics. Going through the established literature, it can 
be learnt that such heuristics have been collectively constructed 
over the years in history and are considered to employ sufficient 
interpretative decision making frames. More importantly, they 
deserve influence on economic decision making practices and 
even the value creation processes. These heuristics are could be 
sensitive to formal contracting especially when concern regarding 
asset specificity arises.
We argue that the asset specificity positively associates with 
formal and relational contracting given the high use of reflexive 
and reproduction heuristics. Because, the higher the use of these 
heuristics the greater as well as faster would be the volume of 
transactions. This situation enhances performance of the firm. 
This is because of the fast and frugal nature of reflexive and 
reproduction heuristics as they offer a flexible mechanism to 
enhance the value chain performance. Consequently, less exercise 
of such heuristics may jeopardize the possibility of enhancing 
value. Based on this argument we would like to state - the higher 
the use of reflexive and reproduction heuristics the greater the 
association between asset specificity and formal contracting and 
so also the association between asset specificity and relational 
contracting, and vice versa.
Following the aforesaid understanding, and speculation the 
researcher states hypotheses H1 and H2 as follows.
H1: The relationship between asset specificity and relational 
contracting will be moderated by reflexive and reproduction 
heuristic, such that the relationship will be positive under 
conditions of high use, and negative under conditions of low use 
of reflexive and reproduction heuristics.
H2: The relationship between asset specificity and formal 
contracting will be moderated using reflexive and reproduction 
heuristic, such that the relationship will be positive under 
conditions of high use, and negative under conditions of low use 
of this heuristic.
Asset specificity is a major decision of the firm that needs to ensure 
full fledge protection at least up to some point after complete 
recovery. Buvik and Haugland (2005) have found positive effect 
of buyer - specific assets on contractual coordination. Higher 
relationship duration was important especially for a vulnerable and 
unilaterally dependent party. A relaxed contractual coordination 
was experienced along the increment in relationship duration when 
both actors mutually deployed specific assets.
Sunde (2007) found that project specific investment positively 
relates with customer and contractor value creation potential and 
innovative performance. However, we think there is something that 
plays role to enhance positive relation between such asset specificity 
and value creation potential. Thus, we argue that the magnitude 
of the interaction between reflexive and reproduction heuristics 
and asset specificity can influence value creation outcome. Such 
interactions either allow the choice of formal contracting or 
relational contracting, both ways can contribute to value creation.
When making, decisions relating to value creations, managers do 
not blindly go after theoretical underpinnings rather they instantly 
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confirm their choice based on their reflexions. Nonetheless, they 
should produce convincing evidences to defend their choice. 
Reflexion should not necessarily come from managers’ own 
experience; they may accumulate it from the outside world 
experience too. Depending upon the frame of reference given to 
the managers, they need to be flexible with the use of available 
heuristics. Based on this line of reasoning we argue that a firm’s 
governance choice for asset specificity is partly backed by reflexive 
heuristics. Again, for the case of reproduction heuristics, similar 
claims could be made. The essence of reproduction heuristics is 
to ensure promising outcomes as the firm has already experienced 
of them. For example, most firms might be able to produce 
satisfactory results from their existing operations and they expect 
same from the new courses of actions. To get this situation, firms 
initiate several middle ground tasks that are mostly perceived safe 
to foster at least status quo results. If we think about decision on 
governance choice for a given specific investment, a firm starts 
thinking from reproduction perspective which means that the firm 
has to initiate some tasks that establish relation with the concerned 
partner, or the firm itself may go for gathering possible information 
that perhaps lead to ensure similar benefits or outcomes as attained 
previously.
Thus, it is apparent that such tasks are basically performed using 
heuristic that has strong potential to perform fast with no extra 
financial burden to the firm. This shows reproduction heuristics 
being the micro foundation of the governance choice procedures 
contributes to find better governance that can create value for 
the whole value chain. If we look on some social heuristics, they 
are found to be widely institutionalized and commonly relied 
upon devices used to cope with uncertainty. Furthermore, they 
provide actors with both a priori and ex post facto justifications 
for economic decisions that appear socially rational. If we take a 
deep look on the value chains, social heuristics could be observed 
sustaining market order, but not necessarily always, in some cases 
it could also result into antagonistic effect discouraging novel 
technologies thereby causing to hinder innovation.
It is, therefore logical to argue that the degree of interaction 
between the asset specificity and the reflexive and reproduction 
heuristics would decide the depth of relationship between asset 
specificity and formal and relational contracting. TCE Literature 
agree that the increased interactions most likely increase the value 
creation through the mediating role of either formal or relational 
or both contracting. More importantly, it would be interesting to 
see how such heuristics positively curb the safeguarding need of 
specific assets using formal or relational means. The higher the 
use of reflexive and reproduction heuristics the better would be 
the relationship between asset specificity and value creation and 
vice versa. Based on this reasoning, we would like to argue that the 
reflexive and reproduction heuristics exert moderating effect over 
the relationships between asset specificity and value creation. Most 
importantly, the use of reflexive and reproduction heuristics should 
have some interactions with different types of assets specificity 
which is mediated through formal or informal or both contracting 
mechanisms for contributing to value creation. In congruence with 
the above-mentioned speculation, articulation and understanding, 
the hypotheses H3 and H4 are stated as follows:
H3: The relationship between asset specificity and value creation 
will be moderated by reflexive and reproduction heuristic, such 
that the relationship will be positive under conditions of high use, 
and negative under conditions of low use of this heuristic.
H4: The interaction between asset specificity and the reflexive 
and reproduction heuristics will result in value creation of asset 
specificity, such that the higher the interaction the better the value 
creation could be and the lower the interaction the value creation.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper explores the role of reflexive and reproduction 
heuristics on the inter-organizational relationships. There has been 
a lot of understanding on the proper safeguarding of specific assets. 
Many of previous researches have confirmed the safeguarding 
potential of formal and relational contracting. This paper does not 
endeavor to contradict with such findings; rather it compliments 
them by exploring the influence of reflexive and reproduction 
heuristics in the form of micro foundations. This paper presumed 
the chosen heuristics are serving as micro foundations and more 
importantly they exert moderating effects on the safeguarding and 
value creating need of assets specificity. Such heuristics and asset 
specificity could be observed interacting with each other thereby 
producing positive influence on value creation aspects. Thus, 
this paper explores the influence of reflexive and reproduction 
heuristics in the inter-organizational relationships. Governance 
mechanisms as dealt by TCE are a kind of prescriptions for the 
specific business circumstances. Given such prescriptions, this 
paper concludes, use of heuristics is a common phenomenon that 
compliments the formal and relational contracting mechanism 
when safeguarding asset specificities.
The proposed framework demonstrates the moderating effects of 
reflexive and reproduction heuristics while designing safeguarding 
on asset specificity and value creation. The interaction between 
asset specificity and the stated heuristics consecutively lead either 
to formal contracting or to relational contracting governance 
mode and eventually ensure value enhancement in one way or 
other. Therefore, we propose value creation possibilities along the 
interaction between the said heuristics and asset specificities. The 
role of reflexive and reproduction heuristics throughout the process 
of inter-organizational value creation process is envisioned; 
however detailed explanation may still fall short.
5. FURTHER RESEARCH AVENUES
This paper open research avenues to future studies that can taste 
the aforesaid hypotheses and the refutable statements as made in 
the paper. This paper mostly portrays simple way of connecting 
heuristics and value creation perspective. Several new facets 
of study both theoretical and empirical could be designed to 
further link heuristics with the doings of firms engaged in inter-
organizational relationships. An interesting study could be to 
address empirically, how heuristics helps in making judgments 
more quickly and frugally that fosters value creation motive of 
firms. Many case studies intending to find implications of different 
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social heuristics using both small and giant enterprises in their 
regular undertakings could be devised to infer strong connections 
of heuristics in both firm level and value chain level value creating 
endeavors.
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